Discuss briefly the question of identity

X at t1 is identical to Y at t2 just in case Y's consciousness is one and the same as X's consciousness. It seems difficult to arbitrate between the IDM and the Anthropological View, and one reason is that they seem to be taking different methodological approaches to identifying the identity conditions for different kinds of entities.

What should we do when they support opposing verdicts? This yields the direct implication that, insofar as I will survive the death of my body, I am justified in anticipating post-mortem experiences.

Consider, then, this criterion of our identity. The nature of the impact of cultural arena has changed with the advent of the Internet, bringing together groups of people with shared cultural interests who before would have been more likely to integrate into their real world cultural arena.

A person must also persist by virtue of psychological continuity. Cambridge University Press, Suppose the technicians who work the machine are sworn to secrecy and immune to bribes. University of California Press. A second sort of answer is that our persistence consists in some brute physical relation.

Identity (social science)

The answer may seem to turn entirely on whether the resulting person would be you or I. While focus on selves could perhaps yield a very complicated form of consequentialism involving the introduction into deliberation of the good of all affected parties — including future selves — weighted according to the degrees of connectedness obtaining between them and the deliberatoranother, perhaps more promising, approach would be to appeal to reductionist selves to buttress a different ethical theory altogether, namely contractualism.

And it also seems possible that psychological continuity isn't necessary for ownership either. The pastiche personality abandons all aspirations toward a true or "essential" identity, instead viewing social interactions as opportunities to play out, and hence become, the roles they play.

Consider, then, prudential rationality. Some say that cutting the main connections between the cerebral hemispheres results in radical disunity of consciousness, and that because of this, two people share a single organism see e.

Perhaps instead the identity relation merely always accompanies, but is not constitutive of, what matters. But one may certainly have direct memories of some past stage that itself had direct memories of an earlier stage, and so on, until every stage in the life is linked by a chain of overlapping direct memories.

What makes an action, experience, or psychological characteristic properly attributable to some person and thus a proper part of his or her true self is its correct incorporation into the self-told story of his or her life MacIntyre, TaylorSchechtmanDeGrazia A Constitution View, Cambridge: The Persistence Question is often confused with other questions, or stated in a tendentious way.

The precise meaning of these phrases is hard to pin down. It has nothing to do with persistence through time. Instead, X and Y are, on Locke's actual view, identical just in case X and Y are related via consciousness, i.

The surroundings, the environment, the people in these places play a factor in how one feels about the culture they wish to adopt. What principle would answer this question? That would make it indeterminate what things, and even what sort of things, we are.

It says that for every period of time when you exist, short or long, there is a temporal part of you that exists only then. Suppose both of my brain hemispheres are functional duplicates of the other, and that each of my other two triplet brothers has suffered irreversible brain damage.

We need not know the answer to the persistence question in order to know how many people there are at any one time; that comes under the population question. To correct the story, therefore, we may have to check it against third-person narratives of my life.

If, for instance, it is psychological continuity that matters instead of the further fact of identity — and matters just as much as identity was thought to i.

Personal Identity

Psychological-continuity theorists have proposed two different solutions to this problem. Both Y and Z would seem to remember X's theft, they would still be buzzing over the thrill of the getaway chase, they would each have inherited an intention to spend the money on wine, women, and song, they would each persist in X's beliefs about the justification for the crime, and so forth.

Of course, one might maintain instead that it is some strong degree of psychological connectedness that provides the unity relation between various temporal stages, but then it seems explicit that the relation preserving what matters is just connectedness, not identity per se.

In other words, even if we allow that continuity comes in degrees, it is not entirely clear why our patterns of concern ought to track the amount and not simply the fact of continuity. If you were an organism, you could too.

Indeed, many scholars demonstrate a tendency to follow their own preconceptions of identity, following more or less the frameworks listed above, rather than taking into account the mechanisms by which the concept is crystallised as reality.

Oxford University Press, So in both cases there is some properly specified action for which it seems only the person identical to the actor may be held responsible. It has nothing to do with psychological facts.

Imagine that your brain is transplanted into my head.But this relation may best be grounded by something like a narrative conception of personal identity, one that answers to the characterization question, not the reidentification question. These sketches suggest the possibility, then, of a plurality of relations between identity and ethics.

Jaunty Anaphora is "an Aria who writes in English"l. Before commenting any further on him or his poetry, I would like to first discuss the whole question of "Identity' itself in general and short, for like anything it could be also defined, penetrated and analyzed from multiple angles.

Chapter 5 Discussion Questions 1. Name and briefly discuss the broad categories that phishing is split into. There are many ways in which someone can use phishing to social engineer someone%(10).

Discuss Briefly the Question of Identity with Reference

Also, discuss briefly the meaning of work across cultures and notable differences discussed in the text and the module. Question In chapter 13 of your text, the authors described self-concept, identity, self-esteem and self-enhancement and attributions across cultures/5(K).

Discuss Briefly the Question of Identity with Reference

Jaunty Anaphora is “an Aria who writes in English”l. Before commenting any further on him or his poetry, I would like to first discuss the whole question of “Identity’ itself in general and short, for like anything it could be also defined, penetrated and.

How to Discuss Sexual Health Use those pronouns and support that patient’s current gender identity, even if their anatomy does not match that identity. • Rephrase your question or briefly explain why you are asking a question if a patient seems offended or reluctant to answer.

Discuss briefly the question of identity
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